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Abstract:  
Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest that minimum 
participation rules (MPRs) are able to reduce free-riding incentives and may facilitate 
cooperation (or at least coordination) at the extensive margin of international environmental 
agreements. Based on a dataset from a world-wide survey among delegates in international 
climate negotiations, this paper assesses preferences for different MPRs for a future climate 
treaty among key players. The empirical findings provide evidence that small countries with 
low bargaining power rather opt for large minimum membership requirements while 
industrialized countries push forward the idea of a small carbon club of the largest emitters 
only. In contrast, delegates from countries in transition try to keep emission thresholds rather 
low which would allow a future agreement to come into force without their signature.  
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1. Introduction 
Collective action problems like global climate change create strong free-riding incentives 
among negotiating parties. To overcome the social dilemma situation, any adequate 
institutional design relying on voluntary contributions has to cope with two major challenges: 
First, at the extensive margin, any agreement has to ensure the participation of sufficient (key) 
players. Second, at the intensive margin, participants have to agree upon a joint provision 
level of the public good and allocate the burden among the different parties. Theoretical 
predictions from the coalition formation literature on international environmental agreements 
(IEA) are rather pessimistic especially when the difference in net benefits between the non-
cooperative and the cooperative outcome is large: any self-enforcing IEA will be signed only 
by a few number of countries and efficiency gains remain modest (e.g., Hoel 1992, Carraro 
and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994).  
Recent theroretical contributions to this literature (Black et al. 1993, Rutz 2001, Harstad 2006, 
Carraro et al. 2009, Weikard et al. 2012) and experimental investigations (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 
2009, Gerber et al. 2013, McEvoy et al. 2014) suggest minimum participation rules (MPRs) to 
hamper free-riding incentives and to facilitate cooperation at the extensive margin. A 
corresponding minimum participation clause ensures that a treaty only enters into force if a 
certain threshold such as a minimum number of ratifying countries is met. Signatories are 
therefore not obliged to commit to any obligation of an agreement until enough other agents 
agree to join the treaty. Barrett (1998a) argues that exougenously determined minimum 
participation rules ususally fail to meet the self-enforcement criterion but may serve as a 
coordinating advice to overcome a tipping point to the mutually preferred equilibrium. 
Rutz (2001) studied 122 IEA treaty texts and only identifies two agreements without any 
minimum participation rule. The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997, established a “double 
trigger” which required (i) at least 55 parties of the United Nations Framework Convention 
(UNFCCC) that (ii) account for at least 55% of total Annex I carbon emissions in 1990 to 
ratify the agreement before it entered into force. While the first condition of this double 
trigger was rapidly met (100 parties in 2003 and currently 192 signatories), the second part 
remained challenging for several years until the protocol finally entered into force in 2005. By 
the end of 2002, ratifying countries accounted for about 44% of 1990 carbon emissions 
(UNFCCC 2002). After Australia and the USA stated that they will not join the treaty, Russia 
(17.4% of 1990 emissions) became the pivotal player in the negotiation process which finally 
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led to the well-known “hot-air” or “carbon-bubble” phenomenon of the Kyoto Protocol (e.g., 
Paltsev 2000, Bernard et al. 2003, Böhringer and Vogt 2003, 2004). In many treaties, the 
actual number of parties exceeds the minimum participation threshold. This observation may 
provide evidence for the coordination device to be the predominant effect of this mechanism 
rather than being able to deter free-riding (Barrett 1999). Following this argument, Rutz 
(2001) concludes that MPRs may not result in substantial improvements of the environmental 
quality since requirements of the treaty do not go far beyond what a country would have done 
in absence of an agreement.  
While several studies empirically assess preferences for different burden sharing rules among 
participants in international climate negotiations (Lange et al. 2007, Lange et al. 2010, Hjerpe 
et al. 2011, Kesternich et al. 20141) there is considerable less empirical evidence with respect 
to the institutional design at the extensive margin. Since negotiating parties have to agree 
upon specific minimum requirements, studying preferences for different MPRs empirically is 
an important step to identify possible pathways and obstacles for these instruments in a future 
climate deal. Black et al. (1993) predict that countries expecting high benefits from an 
agreement will opt for lower minimum participation rule in order to ensure that the agreement 
will enter into force. Harstad (2006) reveals that the threshold should be smaller if the 
heterogeneity of agents is large but increase if the externality is high. 
The Lima call for climate action, adopted by the UNFCCC during its recent COP-20 meeting 
in Peru, aims at laying out the policy basis for a new bottom-up global climate regime and 
highlights the importance of entry into force conditions (UNFCCC 2014). In its elements for a 
draft negotiation text, Article 95.2 includes five different options for entry into force 
conditions that contain minimum participation rules with respect to a minimum number of 
ratifying countries and/or a minimum share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. So 
far, the exact values of these different shares remain unspecified in the draft negotiation text. 
Based on a dataset from a world-wide survey among delegates in UNFCCC climate 
negotiations (COP-16 in Cancún in 2010 and COP-17 in Durban in 2011) the aim of this 
paper is to investigate the perception of different MPRs for a future climate treaty among key 
players. In particular, I study individual preferences with respect to the stringency for (i) a 
minimum number of UNFCC member states (minimum membership threshold) and (ii) a 
minimum percentage rate of global GHG emissions (minimum emission threshold). While 
1 The paper by Kesternich et al. (2014) is based on data from the same underlying questionnaire that consisted of different parts. Further 
analyses based on this data are conducted by Meulemann and Ziegler (2013) and Meulemann (2014). 
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stricter requirements may broaden participation and therefore lead to more cost-effective 
agreements, they may increase veto power for non-signatories and they are also more 
susceptible to coordination failures. This paper may therefore add to the debate whether to 
allow for sub-agreements among a small number of key players (“carbon clubs”) instead of a 
comprehensive and rigid large-scale agreement (Victor 2011).  
In line with the discussions during the Kyoto process, the econometric analysis provides 
evidence that in particular preferences for minimum emission thresholds substantially differ 
among negotiating parties. While industrialized countries push forward the idea of small 
carbon clubs, small countries with low bargaining power rather opt for large membership 
requirements. In contrast, delegates from countries in transition with high current GHG 
emissions try to keep emissions thresholds rather low which might allow them to stay away 
from a forming coalition. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the existing 
theoretical literature and some related experimental evidence. Section 3 contains the empirical 
analysis and a discussion of the econometric results. The last section concludes. 
2. Minimum Participation Rules in International 
Environmental Agreements 
The theoretical literature on coalition formation (e.g., Hoel 1992, Carraro and Siniscalco 
1993, Barrett 1994) usually involves a 𝑁𝑁-player two-stage cartel formation game: In the first 
stage, agents non-cooperatively decide whether to join or not to join a coalition. In the second 
stage, both the coalition (with 𝑘𝑘 signatory countries) and the non-signatories (𝑁𝑁 − 𝑘𝑘) decide 
upon their contribution to the public good. The predictions of these models are rather 
pessimistic: Because of strong free-riding incentives, any self-enforcing IEA will be signed 
only by a small number of countries. Theoretical extensions to the coalition formation 
literature to address the free-riding problem include among others preferences for equity (e.g., 
Lange and Vogt 2003), a partial or modest internalization of joint benefits of the coalition 
members (Finus and Maus 2008) or a minimum participation threshold that has to be met until 
an agreement enters into force (Rutz 2001, Carraro et al. 2009, Weikard et al. 2012). 
Black et al. (1993) are among the first who analyze the effect of an exogenously determined 
MPRs on cooperation. In their model, countries are identical with respects to abatement costs 
but there is ex-ante uncertainty about individual benefits. Depending on the parameter values, 
their results suggest that a minimum membership threshold may enlarge the coalition and 
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increase efficiency in contrast to the non-cooperative outcome. They further report that under 
certain conditions countries expecting high benefits from an agreement will favor a lower 
minimum participation rules in order to ensure that the agreement will enter into force. 
Rutz (2001) considers an exogenously determined MPR in a two-stage coalition formation 
model. With identical countries, efficiency gains are feasible if the required minimum 
threshold (𝑘𝑘�) is set higher than k in the non-cooperative solution. Harstad (2006) describes 
minimum thresholds as an intermediary solution between voluntary or flexible cooperation 
(that causes strong free-riding incentives) and a rigid approach (that treats all heterogeneous 
agents equally). In his model, the contribution to the public good is a binary decision among 
agents differing in their net benefits from the joint project. The analysis shows that the 
minimum participation threshold should be smaller if the heterogeneity of the agents is large 
but larger if the externality is high. Reasonable concerns however remain that a specific MPR 
exists that beats every other alternative in a pairwise vote after the heterogeneity among 
negotiating agents has been realized and thus prevents the political equilibrium.  
Carraro et al. (2009) extend the standard two-stage coalition game by introducing an 
additional pre-stage (the minimum participation stage) where identical agents agree upon the 
minimum share of ratifying countries by unanimity voting. This theoretical framework 
predicts an endogenous MPR to facilitate coalition formation and to strengthen cooperation. If 
the net benefits from coalition formation are increasing rapidly with the number of signatories 
even full cooperation is possible. Agents prefer to “tie their hands” in the minimum 
participation stage and give up the possibility to free-ride in the following stages to ensure 
cooperation gains from the grand coalition (Carraro et al. 2009: p. 422).  
In a related study, Weikard et al. (2012) consider a minimum participation stage with 
simultaneous ratification in a setting where players differ with respect to their costs and 
benefits. In a first stage, a randomly chosen country proposes a minimum abatement threshold 
that has to be accepted by unanimity voting. The grand coalition is an equilibrium outcome if 
the bargaining power of the proposing agent is small or the free-rider proposal of the powerful 
player is unacceptable to at least one other agent. Comparing payoffs of pivotal countries 
under participation and non-participation, the model further predicts that players prefer to be 
non-pivotal instead of being pivotal for an agreement in a simultaneous game since pivotal 
players lack any credible threats to not join the coalition. Under certain assumptions, the 
proposing country can exploit a first-mover advantage by reducing the minimum participation 
level such that it can exploit a non-pivotal position. Therefore, equilibria may exist where at 
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least one country is able to free-ride on the coalition’s gains. It remains an open question 
whether sequential accession, a probably more realistic assumption, alters these predictions. 
Empirical evidence from Russia’s role in the Kyoto process however suggests that sequential 
accession to a treaty may imply that (some) players become pivotal at a certain stage and can 
bargain with the signatories (Weikard et al. 2012: p. 17). 
Recent theoretical work on minimum participation clauses consider second-best agreements 
which do not require to fully internalize the welfare gains of the cooperative coalition 
(Courtois and Haeringer 2012). Other related papers relax the frequent assumption of 
considering players as unitary actors to allow for an interaction between negotiators and 
voters (Köke and Lange 2013).  
Barrett (2003) summarizes some of this literature and argues that an arbitrary chosen 
minimum participation level usually lacks the self-enforcement criteria and is vulnerable to 
renegotiations. MPRs may therefore rather serve as a coordination device. Analyzing the 
Kyoto process, Barrett (1998) concludes that although MPRs in the protocol may have helped 
to reduce free-riding at least to some extent they did not provide adequate incentives to 
increase participation beyond the minimum threshold. Barrett and Stavins (2003) even draw 
are more pessimistic conclusion concerning the effectiveness of minimum participation 
clauses based on the fact that the Kyoto Protocol finally could enter into force with emissions 
reduction targets for countries that accounted for less than 20 percent of global emissions. 
The experimental literature has recently begun to explicitly investigate the membership 
decision in the coalition formation framework. In Kosfeld et al. (2009), subjects in a first 
stage decide whether to join a coaliton. The (potential) coalition members then decide 
whether to implement the institution and to contribute their full endomwent by unanimity 
voting. The results suggest that the majority of all groups of four homogenous players 
establishs the grand coalition. Smaller coalitons, although being profitable from a theoretic 
point of view, are rejected in most cases. If an institution is formed, contributions to the public 
good are higher and more stable in contrast to an uncoordinated action. Gerber et al. (2013) 
investigate the impact of different exogenously determined minimum participation thresholds 
in a 4-players public goods experiment with homogeneous agents. They report that weaker 
institutions do not facilitate coalition formation and thus do not lead to efficiency gains in 
contrast to a full participation rule. Under weaker institutions, many groups accept one player 
to free-ride on the coalition gains which suggests inequality aversion to be rather moderate 
among agents. McEvoy et al. (2014) evaluates the performance of an endogenously 
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determined minimum participation threshold both in setting when efficiency results in the 
grand coalition and when it only requires a 50% membership. In the first stage, participants in 
groups of six homogenous players agree upon a minimum membership requirement by 
majority voting. In the second stage, each player decides whether to join or not to join the 
coalition. If the coalition is formed, signatories contribute to the public good while non-
signatories do not contribute. If coalition formation fails, no one contributes to the joint 
project. The authors report high efficiency gains, especially when efficiency requires full 
participation. When efficiency requires only a subset of players and therefore permits free-
riding on the coalition gains, the coalition is blocked in about one third of the cases which is, 
in contrast to the findings by Gerber et al. (2013), consistent with inequality aversion in social 
preferences models. 
Both the theoretical and the experimental literature provide evidence that MPRs may broaden 
participation and foster cooperation (or at least coordination) in the provision of international 
public goods. MPRs are a common feature of many international environmental agreements 
and an established component both of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. Taking a closer 
look into the development of the double trigger in the Kyoto process however reveals some 
interesting insights on potentially different positions among key players. While AOSIS 
(Alliance of Small Island States), Japan, Switzerland and Russia put forward the idea of 
including a certain number of UNFCCC member states, the US delegation called for a certain 
minimum threshold of carbon emissions (UNFCCC 2000). A proposal made by the 
Norwegian delegation addressed the different positions by proposing a first version of the 
double trigger approach of both MPRs requiring the ratification of 50 UNFCCC member 
states and 75% of Annex I emissions. During the negotiation process, parties rapidly agreed 
upon 50 member states but differ with respect to the share of emissions that should be 
accounted. Japan and Canada voted for a 75% threshold level and the Chinese/G-77 position 
called for a figure not higher than 50%. In the final plenary the (almost) mid-way position of 
60% was again lowered to 55% by the Chairman in order to reduce veto power of any one or 
two countries “[a]lthough non-ratification by any two of the three highest Annex I emitters, 
the US, the EU and the Russian Federation, could still, together, prevent entry into force” 
(UNFCCC 2000, footnote 68). 
Closest to the empirical strategy presented in this paper is a study by Beron et al. (2003) who 
assess ratification decisions of countries with respect to the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that deplete the Ozone Layer. In particular, they focus on the impact of interdependences 
between countries on cooperation which may exist at least to two reasons. First, the protection 
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of the ozone layer is an international public good which creates strong free-riding incentives 
such that ratification decisions are not independent. Second, international trade flows may 
create bargaining power for some (importing) countries over other (exporting) countries. 
Their data suggest that neither free-riding incentives nor decisions of the largest trading 
partners significantly influenced countries’ decisions.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data Description  
The data for the empirical analysis is obtained from a world-wide survey among delegates in 
international climate negotiations. A standardized web-based questionnaire was sent via email 
to 5,767 experts in climate policy in April 2012. The contact details were derived from 
official UNFCCC lists of participants from the COP-16 in Cancún in 2010 and from COP-17 
in Durban in 2011. In addition, national focal points were contacted.2 There was an individual 
login available for each participant to ensure that the questionnaire was only filled out once by 
each individual. In order to prevent possible shortcomings because of limited internet access 
in certain regions, participants additionally had the possibility to send back fillable PDF forms 
via email, postal mail, or fax. In May and June 2012, two reminders were sent out including 
some additional contact information that was obtained from first-round participants. In total, 
5,840 individuals were contacted. 498 participants sent back their answers (response rate: 
8.5%). About 72% of the participants stated information of their personal backgrounds. Since 
not all participants shared their attitudes towards all parts of the survey or break-off the 
questionnaire, the analyses in this paper are based on up to 247 observations from 96 
countries.  
3.2. Econometric Models and Variables 
For the econometric analysis, I consider two different dependent variables: (i) the stated 
minimum number of UNFCCC member states and (ii) the stated minimum percentage share 
of global GHG emissions needed for a future climate agreement entering into force. Both 
variables are limited rather than continuous with lower and upper tail limits of 0 and 𝑧𝑧 with (i) 
𝑧𝑧 = 195 or (ii)  𝑧𝑧 = 100. True values might be just equal to the threshold, but they might also 
be lower or higher. The perceived difference, for instance, between indicating a“0” or a 
2 The list of participants for the COPs remain in many cases preliminary due to many ad-hoc changes in attendances. Therefore, not all 
members of the list of participants have been actually participated in the COP. I control for this issue in the empirical analysis. 
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positive value might be larger than just the simple absolute value. Similar considerations hold 
for observations at 𝑧𝑧 = 195 or (ii)  𝑧𝑧 = 100 in contrast to lower values. OLS regression does 
not account for the censoring and may therefore lead to inconsistent results. A Tobit model 
therefore provides an appropriate estimation technique to account for tail limits. The 
underlying latent variable framework for each individual 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 is given by  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖′𝜷𝜷 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
where 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖 is the vector of explanatory variables, 𝜷𝜷 is the related vector of coefficients and 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎2) is the corresponding error term. The observed  variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 relates to the 
unobserved latent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗ as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = �  0    if 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗    ≤ 0             𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗  if 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗    > 0             
𝑧𝑧   if 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗    > 𝑧𝑧           
Since the distributions of the dependent variables indicate that responses may be categorized 
into different classes along certain focal points rather than being continuous (between the two 
tail limits), as an additional robustness check, I transform the dependent variable into a 
categorical variable with known cell limits based on four categories (see Table A2). The first 
category contains observations that indicated no requirements (= 0) with respect to the 
different minimum thresholds. The second category includes observations in the range from 
larger than zero up to a threshold of (i) 55 countries or (ii) 55% of global GHG emissions 
which corresponds to the numbers in the Kyoto Protocol.3 The third category covers all 
observations that require larger minimum thresholds. The fourth category captures all 
observations at the upper boundary. With the assumption 𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖′𝜷𝜷,𝜎𝜎2) where 𝜎𝜎2 =var( 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖∗|𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖) such interval-coded data can be used for interval regression with maximum 
likelihood (Wooldridge 2002). Cell limits are defined as 𝑎𝑎1 < 𝑎𝑎2 < 𝑎𝑎3 < 𝑎𝑎4 and the error 
term is assumed to be normally distributed. This approach differs from the standard ordered 
probit model where (unknown) cell limits have to be estimated and where, in many cases, 
stricter distributional assumptions have to be fulfilled. In the following, I examine several 
determinants that may influence the assessment of the minimum emissions thresholds 
(MPREM) and the minimum participation thresholds (MPRUN). 
Country groupings: The Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, adopted by the international 
community at COP-17 in 2011, serves as a mandate within the UNFCC to develop an agreed 
3 Note that the Kyoto Protocol required 55% of total Annex I carbon emissions while the number in this survey, as in the Lima call for 
climate action, refers to global GHG emissions. 
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outcome with legal force to all Parties no later than 2015. An important notion of this 
framework is the call for the “widest possible cooperation by all countries and their 
participation in an effective and appropriate international response” (UNFCCC 2012: p.2). 
This elimination of the traditional binary Annex I/non Annex I distinction of the Kyoto 
process is perceived as a crucial step to get countries on track for a comprehensive agreement 
that includes all major emitters (e.g., Aldy and Stavins 2012, Edenhofer et al. 2013).  
An obvious starting point for the analysis on country group effects is to distinguish between 
member states with binding emission targets in the Kyoto Protocol, the 39 so called Annex B 
countries (UNFCCC 1998, Article 3), and those without any binding obligations, captured by 
the binary variable ANNEX B. This group includes all major industrialized countries but no 
large emerging countries like China, Brazil or India. I suspect delegates from Annex B 
countries to opt for high emissions thresholds such that the accession of large countries in 
transition with high GHG emissions becomes essential for a treaty to enter into force. At the 
same time, Annex B countries may rather vote for smaller minimum participation thresholds. 
Such small “carbon clubs” may provide an opportunity to reduce complexity and facilitate 
negotiations on GHG emission reduction targets (Victor 2011).  
In a second step, I follow the UNFCCC party groupings (UNFCCC 2013) and I distinguish 
between five different regional country groups to address potential changes in constellations 
of countries since the Kyoto process: AOSIS, BASIC, EU27, UMBRELLA/EIG and G77 
(without its AOSIS and BASIC members).4 The AOSIS coalition covers a group of 43 small 
island countries that face high levels of vulnerability with respect to changes in the climate 
system (i.e., sea-level-rise). The BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), 
initiated and led by China, unifies four large emerging countries out of the G77 group that 
was initially formed during the negotiations on the Copenhagen Accord in November 2009 
(Olsson et al. 2010).5 EU27 covers the European Union and its member states and is itself a 
Party of the UNFCCC (Economic integration organization) but without any additional voting 
rights apart from those of its member states. The UMBRELLA/EIG (former JUSSCANNZ) 
group represents the position of non-EU industrialized countries. It is a non-formal list 
including Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, the Ukraine and the US 
4 In some cases delegation members worked for different parties in COP-16 and COP-17. I chose the stated home country as the appropriate 
variable for assigning the participants to the different country groups. Taking into account all survey participants, in most of the cases 
(95.4%) delegation members represented their home country in COP-16 and/or COP-17. Only in 15 cases, respondents in both COPs were 
delegation members of a party which was not his or her stated home country or region. As an additional robustness check, I excluded these 
observations from the analysis. This did, however, not affect the main results. Throughout the paper the discussion is based on the full 
sample. 
5 It should be noted that we did not get any responses from India in our survey. When I refer to BASIC throughout the paper, the results do 
not necessarily reflect the Indian position within the group. 
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and the members of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) (formed in 2000) consisting of 
Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland. Table A1 provides 
an overview of the respective country groups. Table A3 summarizes country-level data on 
GDP and current carbon emissions levels for different countries and regions. When the 
different UNFCCC party groupings enter the econometric analysis, G77 countries serve as the 
base category.  
Share of global GHG emissions: An important measure that may influence the assessment of 
MPRs in a future climate agreement is the share of current global GHG emissions of the 
respective country. As discussed in the previous section, the second part of the double trigger 
in the Kyoto Protocol required ratifying countries to cover at least 55% of total Annex I 
carbon emissions. I therefore expect that 2011 emissions levels (CO2) will affect decision 
behavior, mainly in terms of MPREM. In line with the estimation strategy proposed by Beron 
et al. (2003), I jointly consider variables on country groupings together with emission levels 
in order to separate the developmental effect from the level-of-emissions effect (columns 1 
and 4 in Table 2 and 4, columns 1 and 3 in Table 3 and 5). As an alternative approach to 
disentangle this effect, I control for the ratio of greenhouse gas emissions produced relative to 
gross domestic product in 2011 (CO2perGDP) (columns 2 and 5 in Table 2 and 4, columns 2 
and 4 in Table 3 and 5 ). This variable is calculated based on GDP data from the World Bank 
(2014). Due to the relationship between ANNEX B and GDP (at least at per capita levels) (ρ 
= 0.77), in a further robustness check, I focus on per capita GDP (GDPpc) and an interaction 
term of GDPpc and CO2 (CO2XGDPpc) without controlling for any party groupings (columns 
3 and 6, Table 2 and 4).  
Although recent trends in global GHG emissions may provoke a future shift concerning the 
importance of different key players, highly developed countries will probably not be accepted 
to stay away from any future commitments due to their historical responsibility and their 
economic capacity. If that was possible, this might provide incentives to suggest a lower 
emission threshold. However, in order to ensure mitigation commitments from all major 
emitters and to foster participation from economies in transition, developed countries are 
expected to vote for more ambitious minimum emission thresholds. In contrast, emerging 
countries may insist that developed countries should take the lead and may claim their right 
for development. These countries may therefore call for lower minimum emission 
requirements allowing them to free-ride on gains of a coalition formed by other countries. In 
line with this argument, emerging countries may also indicate lower minimum emission 
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thresholds in order to reduce the likelihood of being pivotal for an agreement which, 
according to the predictions by Weikard et al. (2012), may reduce their bargaining power.  
Vulnerability to climate change: Expected impacts and risks of climate change are unevenly 
distributed and are generally more severe for indivdiuals in developing countries (IPCC 
2013). They include climate-related wheather extremes such as heat waves, droughts, floods, 
cyclones or wildfires. Since comparable global data on national vulnerability levels is limited, 
I use coastline data from the CIA World Factbook (2014) to control for a potential 
relationship between the vulnerability to climate change and the assessement of MPRs. 
According to the IPCC, global mean sea levels will continue to rise in the future due to an 
increase in the ocean temperature and an increased loss of mass from glaciers and ice sheets. 
Expected impacts for coastal systems and low-lying areas such as the AOSIS states include 
submergence, coastal floodings and coastal erosion. In line with the predicitons derived by 
Black et al. (1993), countries with long coastlines and therefore higher benefits from the 
public good may favor less restrictive membership requirements to accelerate negotiations 
towards a successful outcome. In contrast, countries being particularly vulnerable to climate 
change usually possess little bargaining power in international climate negotiations and may 
instead rather opt for broad participation levels to strengthen their role in future negotiations 
Form of Government: A number of studies examine the relationship between the form of 
government and pollution levels (e.g., Congleton 1992, Barrett and Graddy 2000, Neumayer 
2002). They report more democratic societies to value environmental quality to a relatively 
larger degree. Barrett and Graddy (2000) find an increase in civil and political freedom to 
improve national environmental quality for different air pollution variables. Neumayer (2002) 
studies environmental commitment assessed through the ratification of different multilateral 
environmental agreements (Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Amendment to the Montreal 
Protocol, the Rotterdam Convention and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety). Except for the 
Rotterdam Convention, the results suggest civil and political freedom to exhibit stronger 
international environmental commitents than non-democracies. Beron et al. (2003) confirm 
this relationship for the Montreal Protocol agreement negotiated in 1987. These papers argue 
that authoritarian regimes are less likely to commit to long-term agreements since dictators 
usually prefer decisions over relatively short time horizons due to uncertainties about the 
future. Following these observations, I hypothize delegates from countries with more 
democratic forms of governments to call for broader participation rates in a future climate 
deal. As suggested in the previous studies, I include a binary variable FREE that equals to one 
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for countries with the highest freedom status taking into account both political rights and civil 
liberty constructed by Freedom House (2014).6 
Self-assessment of bargaining power: Sequential accession to a treaty with a minimum 
participation clause may imply that (some) players become pivotal at a certain stage and can 
bargain with the signatories. As discussed previously, Russia became decisive for the Kyoto 
Protocol to enter into force after Australia and the USA stated not to ratify the agreement. In 
line with the argument of the expected impact of vulnerability on response behavior, delegates 
perceiving their bargaining power to be rather low may vote for high participation thresholds. 
To test this relationship, I construct an indicator variable POWERFUL that equals to one if 
the delegates perceives the bargaining position of their country to be “very powerful” or 
“powerful”, and zero otherwise.7 
Further sociodemographic information like the respondents’ age, sex, educational background 
or working field serve as additional control variables. Moreover, I take into account whether 
respondents were delegation members of national parties in COP-16 or/and COP-17 (about 
78% of all participants). These variables however do not alter the main effects and are 
therefore not explicitly shown in the regression tables. Table A4 provides an overview of all 
explanatory variables with a brief description and summary statistics. 
3.3. Empirical Results 
The descriptive results indicate average minimum membership thresholds for a future climate 
regime across all survey participants to amount to 60 countries (about 31% of all UNFCCC 
member states) (Table 1). While 32.8% of all respondents opt for a rule that does not exceed 
the Kyoto commitments (55 countries), 46.2% call for broader minimum participation rates. 
Considering minimum emissions thresholds, the assessment of the delegates reflects a more 
ambitious position, covering 44.4% of all global carbon emissions. 40.1% of all participants 
even suggest that an agreement should not enter into force until ratifying countries account for 
more than 55% of global emissions. These observations again stress the importance of large 
emitters like China (28.1% of global CO2 emissions in 2011, see Table A3) and the USA 
(15.9% of global CO2 emissions in 2011) in the negotiation process. Rejection rates (i.e., no 
requirements) are larger for MPRUN (21.0%) than for MPREM (16.2%). Figure A1 illustrates 
substantial differences in positions for emission thresholds among country groups. As 
6 The variable is constructed based on a three point scale (not free, partly free, free). 
7 The variable is constructed based on a four point Likert scale (very powerful, powerful,  moderately powerful, not powerful). 
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expected, average indicated MPREM are largest among UMBRELLA/EIG members (mean: 
58.5%, median: 66%) and lowest among negotiators from BASIC countries (mean: 31.0%, 
median: 20%). The median threshold suggested by the UMBRELLA/EIG countries would 
hardly allow for an agreement to enter into force without the membership of the BASIC group 
who are responsible for 35.8% of all GHG emissions in 2011. Analogously, only a small 
minority of UMBRELLA/EIG participants would accept an agreement without any MPREM 
whereas 29.6% of BASIC members do not indicate any specific target. While 75% of all 
AOSIS participants indicate a minimum emission threshold not to exceed 55% of global 
carbon emissions, more than half of the UMBRELLA/EIG and the EU27 group favor a 
minimum requirement of at least 50% of global carbon emissions. Similarly to the AOSIS and 
the BASIC group, interviewees from G77 countries opt for lower MPREM (mean: 41.3%, 
median: 50%). These findings correspond to the proposals in the Kyoto negotiations where 
Chinese/G-77 delegates favored a threshold below 50% of global carbon emissions. 
Table 1: Descriptive results on minimum membership and emission thresholds  
Minimum number of UNFCCC member states 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median No 
requirement  
0 < 
MPRUN 
≤ 55 55 < MPRUN ≤ 195 N 
    % share   
All 60.4 52.3   50 21.0 32.8 46.2 195 
ANNEX B 54.6 45.1   50 19.7 39.3 41.0   61 
AOSIS 81.9 54.6 100   9.1 27.3 63.6   11 
BASIC 60.0 59.1   50 39.1 13.0 47.9   23 
EU27 57.0 45.0   50 18.6 41.9 39.5   43 
UMBRELLA/EIG 48.8 48.2   50 21.1 36.8 41.1   19 
G77 60.8 52.8   50 18.6 33.7 47.7   86 
Minimum share of global GHG emissions 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Median No 
requirement 
0% < 
MPRem 
≤ 55% 55% < MPRem ≤ 100% N 
     % share 
All 44.4 31.5 50 16.2 43.7 40.1 247 
ANNEX B 52.8 27.9 60 12.5 35.2 52.3   88 
AOSIS 37.8 25.3 41.5   8.3 75.0 16.7   12 
BASIC 31.0 32.6 20 29.6 44.4 25.9   27 
EU27 47.5 30.5 51 18.6 33.9 47.5   59 
UMBRELLA/EIG 58.5 25.3 66   8.6 37.1 54.3   35 
G77 41.3 32.6 50 16.2 46.5 37.3   99 
 
Individual perception of minimum membership requirements appears to be less diverse than 
emission thresholds. As expected, participants from AOSIS countries call for broad 
participation rates with an average of 82 of all 195 UNFCCC member states. In contrast, 
delegates from UMBRELLA/EIG countries indicate a mean minimum threshold of only 49 
countries. The average proposal indicated from AOSIS participants in the survey has more 
than doubled in contrast to the Kyoto process where delegates from this region initially 
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proposed 30 countries as their preferred threshold (UNFCCC 2000). 39.1% of all participants 
from BASIC countries entirely reject a minimum membership requirement in a future climate 
agreement. 
In the following, the discussion is based on the econometric results in order to analyze these 
first observations more in detail. I start with the discussion of the MPREM and then turn to the 
MPRUN. Table 2 reports result from the initial model specification, distinguishing between 
Annex B and Non-Annex B grouping only. In the Tobit models, the estimates can be 
interpreted as the marginal effect of the explanatory variable on the latent variable, that is on 
the values of 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, ignoring the censoring In addition, I present marginal effects for the 
subpopulation for which 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is not at the tail limits in the Appendix.  
There is evidence for a significant positive effect for Annex B countries on the assessment of 
MPREM across all model specifications (p<0.01, Table 2). Delegates from countries with 
binding emission targets in the Kyoto Protocol opt for more ambitious minimum requirements 
than countries without any obligations in the agreement. After having controlled for the share 
of global CO2 emissions and the emission intensity with respect to GDP, the mean of the 
marginal effect for participants from ANNEX B countries amounts to 21.0 percentage points 
(Table 2, column 2) and is about half the size for those with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 between 0 and 𝑧𝑧 (Table A5). 
Current national GHG levels negatively affect preferences for high MPREM: The higher the 
current emissions levels, the lower the indicated minimum emission thresholds (at least 
p<0.1). After having controlled for Annex B participation, an increase in the share of global 
GHG emissions by the respective country by one percentage points lowers the preferred 
MPREM by 1.4 percentage points. The effect remains in a similar range (1.3 percentage points) 
if emission intensity with respect to GDP is taken into account (Table 2, column 2). Again, 
the marginal effects for those with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 not at the boundary are almost half the size (Table A5). 
The negative impact of CO2 on the assessment of MPREM also holds when controlling for per 
capita GDP which itself again positively influences minimum emission thresholds (at least 
p<0.05, columns 3 and 6). These findings indicate that the developing effect appears to be the 
dominant driver. Fast growing emerging countries with high current emissions levels are more 
likely to oppose against high MPREM than other countries. 
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Table 2: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models and interval regression, country 
groups: Annex B/non-Annex B 
 Tobit  Interval Regression 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES MPREM MPREM MPREM  MPREM MPREM MPREM 
ANNEX B 21.11*** 21.00***   20.36*** 20.24***  
 (6.785) (6.743)   (7.656) (7.639)  
CO2  -135.7* -129.5* -204.9**  -171.4** -165.4** -240.2*** 
 (69.19) (71.36) (84.70)  (70.19) (73.74) (84.26) 
CO2 per GDP  -2.307    -2.230  
  (8.020)    (8.586)  
GDP pc   0.381***    0.367** 
   (0.145)    (0.154) 
CO2 X GDP pc   7.510***    7.444** 
   (2.829)    (3.249) 
COASTLINE 0.00581 0.00609 -0.0207  0.00563 0.00595 -0.0204 
 (0.0838) (0.0836) (0.0836)  (0.0951) (0.0948) (0.0951) 
FREE -11.75* -12.18* -13.03*  -13.42* -13.82* -14.75** 
 (6.901) (7.260) (6.947)  (7.597) (7.806) (7.454) 
POWERFUL -1.489 -1.445 -2.058  0.182 0.223 -0.344 
 (6.564) (6.558) (6.586)  (7.062) (7.032) (6.965) 
Controls yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Constant 54.38*** 54.95*** 56.95***  54.28*** 54.82*** 56.90*** 
 (12.99) (13.23) (12.75)  (13.90) (14.11) (13.78) 
Sigma 36.45*** 36.44*** 36.16***     
 (2.193) (2.193) (2.191)     
ln(Sigma)     3.610*** 3.610*** 3.604*** 
     (0.0601) (0.0601) (0.0611) 
Log likelihood -853.0 -853.0 -851.8  -230.2 -230.2 -229.2 
Observations 202 202 202  202 202 202 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, further control variables: AGE, FEMALE, ECON, NGO, COPparty 
 
Table 3 reports estimated coefficients for the different UNFCCC party groupings and confirm 
the previous observations. Delegates from EU27 (p<0.1 but only in the Tobit models) and 
UMBRELLA/EIG countries (p<0.05) are more likely to indicate higher shares for minimum 
emissions requirements than participants from the G77 group. The share indicated by EU27 
(UMBRELLA/EIG) negotiators is on average 17.1 (28.7) percentage points higher after 
having controlled for UNFCCC party groupings, the share of global CO2 emissions and the 
emission intensity with respect to GDP.8 In order to detect differences between the country 
groups beyond those to the base category I conduct a series of pairwise postestimation Wald 
tests after the fitted models on differences in estimated coefficients. This analysis reveals 
negotiators from UMBRELLA/EIG members to indicate significantly higher emissions 
thresholds than delegates from AOSIS (p<0.1) and from BASIC countries (p<0.1 but only in 
the Tobit models). The negative impact of current emissions levels and the positive effect of 
per capita GDP remain significant in all model specifications. The average marginal effect for 
an increase in the share of global GHG emissions by the respective country is in the similar 
8 A similar model specification, where I distinguish between EU27, UMBRELLA/EIG and other countries only reveals similar effects. In 
contrast to all other delegates, the indicated share of the EU27 (UMBRELLA/EIG) group is 12.4 (24.8) percentage points higher.  
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range as before (1.4 percentage points) (Table 3, column 2). The effects of further explanatory 
variables only provide little additional insights. Both the length of the coastline, as an 
indicator for vulnerability to climate change, and the perceived bargaining power do not alter 
the decision towards MPREM in the sample significantly. Countries with the highest freedom 
status considering both political rights and civil liberty appear to opt for lower MPREM but 
this effect becomes insignificant as soon as the different party groupings are included in the 
analysis. Summarizing these findings, delegates from industrialized countries rather vote for 
an emission threshold that requires all major current emitters to participate in a future climate 
deal. In contrast, delegates from emerging countries suggest lower minimum requirements 
which might allow for a climate treaty formed by developed countries only. This latter 
position may be driven by the frequent call for an equal right for development. It reflects 
current challenges of the Durban Platform on ensuring participation and commitment to 
ambitious emissions reductions in a future climate deal. 
Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models and interval regression, country 
groups: UNFCCC party groupings 
 Tobit  Intervall Regression 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES MPREM MPREM  MPREM MPREM 
AOSIS 8.347 8.969  0.170 0.746 
 (11.64) (11.61)  (12.35) (12.22) 
BASIC 7.001 8.096  6.525 7.520 
 (12.16) (12.51)  (13.06) (13.34) 
EU27 16.94* 17.09*  14.00 14.14 
 (9.465) (9.464)  (10.76) (10.73) 
UMBRELLA/EIG 28.32*** 28.71***  21.70** 22.05** 
 (8.074) (8.161)  (9.616) (9.623) 
CO2  -150.6* -143.1*  -183.7** -176.8** 
 (76.35) (76.15)  (80.04) (80.71) 
CO2 per GDP  -3.979   -3.630 
  (8.627)   (8.932) 
COASTLINE -0.0320 -0.0323  -0.0129 -0.0131 
 (0.0916) (0.0912)  (0.105) (0.104) 
FREE -11.04 -12.15  -10.55 -11.56 
 (7.653) (8.212)  (8.823) (9.162) 
POWERFUL -3.169 -3.268  -2.074 -2.168 
 (6.813) (6.775)  (7.352) (7.327) 
Controls  yes  yes yes 
Constant 49.98*** 50.91***  50.97*** 51.80*** 
 (13.00) (13.21)  (13.90) (14.12) 
Sigma 36.38*** 36.37***    
 (2.186) (2.185)    
ln(Sigma)    3.615*** 3.615*** 
    (0.0600) (0.0600) 
Log likelihood -852.8 -852.7  -231.1 -231.1 
Observations 202 202  202 202 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, further control variables: AGE, FEMALE, ECON, NGO, COPparty 
 
Following the descriptive findings, the econometric results of the minimum membership 
requirements reveals that Annex B countries call for smaller participation rates at least p<0.1 
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but only in the Tobit models, Table 4). After having controlled for the share of global CO2 
emissions and the emission intensity with respect to GDP, the mean of the marginal effect for 
participants from Annex B countries suggest that those negotiators prefer a MPRUN containing 
about 27 fewer countries than other delegates (Table 4, column 2). In line with the initial 
hypothesis, there is evidence that delegates perceiving their bargaining power to be low tend 
to vote for higher participation rules (Table 4, column 2 and 5). Further support for this 
relationship can be derived from the analysis of the different country groups (Table 5). The 
estimated coefficient for AOSIS is highest in all model specifications and differs significantly 
from those obtained for EU27 (at least p<0.1, postestimation test) and UMBRELLA/EIG 
(p<0.1, but only for postestimation tests of the Tobit models). Small countries may therefore 
perceive a minimum membership threshold as an instrument to strengthen their bargaining 
position in future negotiations. In contrast, high developed countries set a lower threshold to 
allow for smaller agreements (p<0.05, Table 4 and Table 5, column 6). Again, the effects for 
vulnerability and freedom status remain insignificant in the sample. 
Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models and interval regression, country 
groups: Annex B/non-Annex B 
 Tobit  Interval Regression 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES MPRUN MPRUN MPRUN  MPRUN MPRUN MPRUN 
ANNEX B -27.17* -27.32*   -18.17 -18.89  
 (14.32) (14.15)   (14.20) (14.14)  
CO2  -70.08 -61.75 -158.5  -26.91 16.17 -155.1 
 (123.5) (130.9) (164.4)  (138.9) (142.2) (172.3) 
CO2 per GDP  -2.965    -15.18  
  (20.57)    (19.01)  
GDP pc   -0.298    -0.335 
   (0.348)    (0.318) 
CO2 X GDP pc   5.342    10.72** 
   (4.225)    (4.622) 
COASTLINE -0.0855 -0.0862 -0.139  0.0306 0.0284 -0.00772 
 (0.209) (0.208) (0.219)  (0.276) (0.273) (0.282) 
FREE 7.773 7.316 -2.804  2.027 -0.443 -4.663 
 (14.26) (15.50) (14.90)  (14.20) (15.44) (14.57) 
POWERFUL -21.56* -21.68* -14.70  -21.34* -21.80* -15.74 
 (12.64) (12.62) (12.27)  (12.63) (12.58) (12.26) 
Controls yes yes yes  yes yes yes 
Constant 4.656 5.763 10.39  -2.597 2.754 4.509 
 (27.94) (28.75) (29.13)  (27.37) (28.39) (27.82) 
Sigma 64.75*** 64.74*** 65.45***     
 (4.421) (4.431) (4.420)     
ln(Sigma)     4.089*** 4.087*** 4.084*** 
     (0.0845) (0.0847) (0.0852) 
Log likelihood -676.2 -676.2 -677.1  -155.9 -155.7 -155.3 
Observations 149 149 149  149 149 149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, further control variables: AGE, FEMALE, ECON, NGO, COPparty 
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Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models and interval regression, dependent 
variable: minimum emissions requirements (MPRUN), country groups: UNFCCC party 
groupings 
 Tobit  Intervall Regression 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES MPRUN MPRUN  MPRUN MPRUN 
AOSIS 25.04 25.96  21.26 23.55 
 (23.19) (23.16)  (23.24) (23.09) 
BASIC 25.09 26.78  14.97 19.13 
 (25.41) (25.20)  (24.59) (24.72) 
EU27 -13.81 -13.88  -12.01 -12.14 
 (18.11) (18.12)  (18.43) (18.46) 
UMBRELLA/EIG -8.389 -8.115  0.596 1.668 
 (19.57) (19.66)  (20.67) (20.43) 
CO2  -139.0 -118.3  -71.54 -24.49 
 (137.3) (144.1)  (152.6) (153.1) 
CO2 per GDP  -8.845   -20.33 
  (20.10)   (19.54) 
GDP pc      
      
CO2 X GDP pc      
      
COASTLINE -0.119 -0.122  -0.0395 -0.0479 
 (0.237) (0.236)  (0.301) (0.296) 
FREE -5.463 -7.324  -6.055 -10.52 
 (15.81) (16.98)  (16.19) (17.52) 
POWERFUL -25.28* -26.03*  -23.20* -24.79* 
 (14.12) (14.01)  (13.44) (13.40) 
Controls yes yes  yes yes 
Constant 4.937 8.113  -2.518 4.354 
 (27.48) (28.35)  (27.16) (28.20) 
Sigma 64.37*** 64.31***    
 (4.359) (4.378)    
ln(Sigma)    4.085*** 4.080*** 
    (0.0846) (0.0850) 
Log likelihood -675.6 -675.5  -155.4 -155.0 
Observations 149 149  149 149 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, further control variables: AGE, FEMALE, ECON, NGO, COPparty 
4. Conclusions 
To overcome the social dilemma situation in current international climate policy, any 
adequate institutional design has to address participation and commitment of sufficient (key) 
players. Recent contributions to the theoretical and experimental literature suggest minimum 
participation requirements to reduce free-riding incentives and to facilitate cooperation (or at 
least coordination) at the extensive margin of a future climate treaty. Minimum participation 
rules are a common institutional design in international environmental agreements: Rutz 
(2001) studied 122 IEA treaty texts and only identifies two agreements without any minimum 
participation rules. While stricter requirements may broaden participation and therefore lead 
to more cost-effective agreements, they are also more susceptible to coordination failures and 
may increase veto power for non-signatories. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force eight 
years after it was negotiated in 1997 since the second part of its double trigger (at least 55 
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parties of UNFCCC member states that include at least 55% of total Annex I carbon 
emissions in 1990) was hardly to be met after Australia and the USA declined to join the 
treaty such that Russia was decisive for the treaty to enter into force. 
Based on a dataset from a world-wide survey among delegates in international climate 
negotiations (COP-16 in Cancún in 2010 and COP-17 in Durban in 2011), I assessed 
individual preferences for different minimum participation rules among different groups of 
countries. Summarizing the empirical findings, discussions on MPRs in ongoing climate 
negotiations are expected to remain controversial. That holds particularly with respect to a 
minimum emission threshold. Small countries with low bargaining power in international 
climate negotiations call for ambitious membership requirements which may help to 
strengthen their position in future negotiations. High developed countries set lower minimum 
membership requirements but opt for emission thresholds that require all major current 
emitters to participate in a future climate deal. They may therefore push forward the idea of 
having a small sub-agreement among the largest emitters only (“carbon clubs”). In contrast, 
delegates from countries in transition suggest lower emissions thresholds which would allow 
them to stay away from a climate treaty formed by developed countries only. This latter 
position may be driven by the frequent call for equal rights for development and reflect the 
current challenges on ensuring participation and commitment to ambitious emissions 
reductions in future climate negotiations. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Overview on party groupings 
Description Shortcut 
43 member states of the Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS 
  
Brazil, South Africa, India, China BASIC 
  
27 member states of the European Union EU27 
  
Australia, Canada, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway,  
Republic of Korea, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, USA 
UMBRELLA/EIG 
  
133 member states of the G77 group without AOSIS and BASIC members G77 
 
Table A2: Summary statistics of the dependent variables  
Categories  MPRUN %  MPREM % 
𝑎𝑎1  ≤     0 (left-censored)  21.03  ≤     0 (left-censored)  16.19 
𝑎𝑎2  >     0 until ≤   55  32.82  >     0 until ≤   55  43.72 
𝑎𝑎3  >   55 until < 195  45.64  >   55 until < 100  36.44 
𝑎𝑎4  ≥ 195 (right-censored)    0.51  ≥ 100 (right-censored)    3.64 
TOTAL   100.00  
(n=195) 
  100.00 
(n=247) 
 
Table A3: Data on GDP, population and carbon emissions for respective countries and 
regions 
 GDP 2011 
(in current 
Billion US$) 
Share of 
global GDP 
(in %) 
CO2 
emissions 
2011  
(in Mtons) 
Share of 
global CO2 
emissions  
(in %) 
WORLD 71,028.5 100.0 33,986.3 100.0 
AOSIS 479.1 0.7 18.7 0.1 
BASIC 12,080.5 17.0 12,160.2 35.8 
  Brazil 2,476.7 3.5 447.2 1.3 
  South Africa 401.8 0.6 327.1 1.0 
  India 1,880.1 2.6 1,838.4 5.4 
  China 7,321.9 10.3 9,547.5 28.1 
EU27 17,614.6 24.8 3,787.1 11.1 
  France 2,779.7 3.9 369.4 1.1 
  Germany 3,624.9 5.1 794.7 2.3 
  United Kingdom 2,478.9 3.5 471.3 1.4 
UMBRELLA/EIG 30,208.7 42.5 10,401.7 30.6 
  Australia 1,386.9 2.0 440.3 1.3 
  Canada 1,737.0 2.4 563.2 1.7 
  Japan 5,896.8 8.3 1,244.3 3.7 
  Mexiko 1,159.9 1.6 468.8 1.4 
  Republic of Korea 1,114.5 1.6 69.8 0.2 
  Russia 1,899.1 2.7 1,780.4 5.2 
  USA 15,533.8 21.9 5,392.2 15.9 
G77 8,347.8 11.8 4,763.8 14.0 
Note: Data on GDP is taken from the the World Bank (2014) and data on CO2 emissions is obtained from Emission Database for Global 
Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) (Olivier et al. 2013). 
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Table A4: Descriptive information on explanatory variables 
 
Variable  MPRUN 
(n=195) 
MPREM 
(n=247) 
  % % 
ANNEX B = 1, if stated home country is a member of the ANNEX B group in 
the Kyoto Protocol 
31.3 35.6 
AOSIS = 1, if stated home country is AOSIS member   5.6   4.9 
BASIC = 1, if stated home country is BASIC member 11.8 10.9 
EU27 = 1, if stated home country is EU27 member 22.1 23.9 
UMBRELLA/EIG = 1, if stated home country is UMBRELLA/EIG member   9.7 13.8 
 No information for 5 (4) observations    2.6   1.6 
CO2 2011 share of global CO2 emissions 
Mean: 0.02 (0.01) 
Min: 2.94e-08 (Nauru), Max: 0.28 (China) 
No information for 7 (8) observations 
 
 
 
  3.6 
 
 
 
  3.2 
GDP pc 2011 gross domestic product per capita in 2011 in 1,000 current USD 
Mean: 18.8 
Min: 0.25 (Congo), Max: 111.8 (Luxembourg) 
No information for 11 (8) observations 
 
 
 
  5.6 
 
 
 
  3.3 
COASTLINE coastline of home country in1,000 km 
Mean: 6.6 (9.4) 
Min: 0, Max: 202.1 (Canada) 
No information for 7 (7) observations 
 
 
 
  5.1 
 
 
 
  2.8 
FREE = 1, if stated home country is categorized as free in terms of the 
country’s political rights and civil liberties 
53.8 
 
57.1 
POWERFUL = 1, if respondent assesses the home countries’ bargaining position 
in current climate negotiations to be “very powerful” or “powerful” 
No information for 19 (21) 
27.8 
 
  9.7 
25.2 
 
  8.5 
AGE in years 
Mean: 46  Min: 23  Max: 74 (for MPRUN) 
Mean: 45  Min: 23  Max: 76 (for MPREM) 
No information for 4 (3) observations 
 
 
 
  2.1 
 
 
 
  1.2 
FEMALE = 1, if respondent is a woman 
No information for 2 (2) observations 
26.9 
  1.0 
24.5 
  0.8 
ECON = 1, if individual’s highest degree is obtained in the field of 
economics or business administration 
No information for 10 (9) observations 
18.4 
 
  5.1 
18.5 
 
  3.6 
NGO = 1, if the respondent works for an NGO 
No information for 8 (8) observations 
12.3 
  4.1 
13.0 
  3.2 
COPparty = 1, if the respondent was a delegation member in COP-16 and/or 
COP-17  
No information for 6 (6) observations 
80.4 
 
  3.1 
80.9 
 
  2.4 
24 
Table A5: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models (marginal effects of the truncated 
expected value), country groups: Annex B/non-Annex B  
 Tobit  
 (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES MPREM MPREM MPREM  
ANNEX B 10.02*** 9.963***   
 (3.320) (3.304)   
CO2  -64.07** -61.14* -20.80  
 (32.45) (33.50) (26.64)  
CO2 per GDP  -1.090   
  (3.788)   
GDP pc   0.226***  
   (0.0699)  
COASTLINE 0.00274 0.00287 -0.00986  
 (0.0396) (0.0395) (0.0398)  
FREE -5.512* -5.709* -6.159*  
 (3.169) (3.333) (3.226)  
POWERFUL -0.703 -0.682 -0.980  
     
Controls yes yes yes  
     
Observations 202 202 202  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A6: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models (marginal effects of the truncated 
expected value), country groups: UNFCCC party groupings 
    
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES MPREM MPREM  
AOSIS 3.966 4.263  
 (5.526) (5.507)  
BASIC 3.314 3.832  
 (5.736) (5.893)  
EU27 8.005* 8.079*  
 (4.504) (4.503)  
UMBRELLA/EIG 13.40*** 13.58***  
 (3.769) (3.803)  
CO2  -71.27** -67.73*  
 (35.81) (35.79)  
CO2 per GDP  -1.884  
  (4.081)  
COASTLINE -0.0151 -0.0153  
 (0.0433) (0.0431)  
FREE -5.194 -5.713  
 (3.515) (3.762)  
POWERFUL -1.498 -1.545  
 (3.227) (3.210)  
    
Controls yes yes  
    
Observations 202 202  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models (marginal effects of the truncated 
expected value), country groups: Annex B/non-Annex B 
 Tobit  
 (1) (2) (3)  
VARIABLES MPRUN MPRUN MPRUN  
ANNEX B -13.15* -13.22*   
 (6.966) (6.891)   
CO2  -34.50 -30.41 -27.49  
 (60.63) (64.20) (51.70)  
CO2 per GDP  -1.460   
  (10.14)   
GDP pc   -0.105  
   (0.165)  
COASTLINE -0.0421 -0.0425 -0.0679  
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.106)  
FREE 3.810 3.588 -1.369  
 (6.979) (7.580) (7.280)  
POWERFUL -10.40* -10.46* -7.076  
 (5.924) (5.919) (5.773)  
     
Controls yes yes yes  
     
Observations 149 149 149  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table A8: Maximum likelihood estimates in Tobit models (marginal effects of the truncated 
expected value), country groups: UNFCCC party groupings 
 Tobit  
 (1) (2)  
VARIABLES MPRUN MPRUN  
AOSIS 12.93 13.44  
 (12.38) (12.41)  
BASIC 12.80 13.70  
 (13.26) (13.19)  
EU27 -6.735 -6.776  
 (8.745) (8.754)  
UMBRELLA/EIG -4.098 -3.970  
 (9.472) (9.531)  
CO2  -68.82 -58.64  
 (67.58) (70.93)  
CO2 per GDP  -4.383  
  (9.996)  
COASTLINE -0.0588 -0.0604  
 (0.117) (0.117)  
FREE -2.711 -3.640  
 (7.854) (8.456)  
POWERFUL -12.20* -12.57*  
 (6.563) (6.511)  
Controls yes yes  
    
Observations 149 149  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1: Descriptive results on specific minimum participation rules 
(i) MPRUN (ii) MPREM 
  
Note: The colored box indicates the lower and upper quartiles of the responses. The subdividing line represents the median. The length of the 
box represents the interquartile range (IQR). The lines (whiskers) span all data points within 1.5 IQR of the lower or upper quartile and stops 
at the smallest value (adjacent value). Any further outliers beyond the whiskers are shown individually. See Cox (2009) for more 
information. 
0 50 100 150 200
No. of countries
G77
UMBRELLA+EIG
EU27
BASIC
AOSIS
0 20 40 60 80 100
%
G77
UMBRELLA+EIG
EU27
BASIC
AOSIS
27 
